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Abstract
The paper presents a program to construct a non-relativistic rela-
tional Bohmian theory, that is, a theory of N moving point-like par-
ticles that dispenses with space and time as fundamental background
structures. The relational program proposed is based on the best-
matching framework originally developed by Julian Barbour. In par-
ticular, the paper focuses on the conceptual problems that arise when
trying to implement such a program. It is argued that pursuing a rela-
tional strategy in the Bohmian context leads to a more parsimonious
ontology than that of standard Bohmian mechanics without betraying
the original motivations for adopting a primitive ontology approach to
quantum physics. It is also shown how a relational Bohmian approach
might clarify the issue of the timelessness of the dynamics resulting
from the quantization of a classical relational system of particles.
Keywords: Bohmian mechanics; primitive ontology; relationalism;
background independence; best-matching; shape space; time capsule.
1 Bohmian Mechanics and Primitive Ontology
Bohmian mechanics (BM) in its modern formulation as laid down in Dürr et al.
(2013) is the simplest non-trivial Galilean-invariant theory of moving point-
like particles. The dynamics of the theory is encoded in the following two
1
equations:1
i
∂Ψ(Q, t)
∂t
=
(
−
N∑
i=1
∇2i
2mi
+ V
)
Ψ(Q, t); (1a)
dQ
dt
= m−1Im
∇Ψ
Ψ
(Q, t). (1b)
Equation (1a) is the usual time-dependent Schrödinger equation for a N -
particle system interacting through a potential V , where the wave function
Ψ is defined over R3N , which is considered the configuration space of the
theory: Q =

 q1· · ·
qN

 represents in fact a point in this space.
Equation (1b) is the so-called guiding equation for the particles, where ∇ =
 ∇1· · ·
∇N

 is the “gradient vector”, and m is the N ×N diagonal “mass ma-
trix” {δijmi}, mi being the mass of the i-th particle.2
The physical interpretation of BM is straightforward: the theory talks about
N massive spinless3 point-like particles with definite positions in Euclidean
3-space at all times; the wave function in this picture has the role of generat-
ing the vector field on the right-hand side of (1b), and this is why it is said to
“guide” the motion of the particles. The “quantumness” of BM resides in the
fact that, according to (1b), the motion of each particle is instantaneously
dependent on the position of all the other N−1 particles. This is the way BM
implements the empirically proven non-locality of the quantum realm, that
is, by virtue of (1b) being a non-local law. Furthermore, BM is fundamentally
a universal theory since (1) describes the dynamics of all there is in the uni-
verse - i.e. particles. However, the theory provides a consistent procedure for
defining sub-configurations of particles approximately behaving as isolated
quantum systems guided by an “effective” sub-wave function. It is exactly
thanks to this fact that BM accounts for ordinary quantum measurements,
thus resulting empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics.4
As it stands, BM is the epitome of a primitive ontology approach to quantum
physics which, in a nutshell, includes all those theoretical frameworks involv-
1We assume for simplicity’s sake that ~ = 1.
2It is important to highlight that equations (1) can be generalized to whatever configu-
ration space endowed with a non-trivial Riemannian structure gij 6= δij . See (Dürr et al.,
2006, section 2) for the technical details.
3However, the theory can be easily generalized in order to account for phenomena
involving spin, as shown, for example, in Norsen (2014).
4See Dürr et al. (1992) for a rigorous justification of these claims.
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ing a dual structure (X ,Ψ), with X the primitive ontology properly said (in
the present case, point-particles) and Ψ being the element of the theory that
dictates the dynamical evolution of X . According to this sketch (developed,
for example, in Allori et al., 2008), also dynamical collapse theories such as
the one proposed by Ghirardi et al. (1986) can be considered as primitive
ontology approaches.
Usually, quantum theories involving a primitive ontology are considered a
“reaction” to one of the most compelling conceptual problems faced by stan-
dard quantum mechanics, namely, the measurement problem. Roughly, this
is because postulating the existence of fundamental “stuff” evolving in space
and time is taken as a natural step to explain the fact that the description
of quantum measurements is always given in “classical” terms, e.g. definite
pointer positions.
Here we do not want to enter in any detail into the debate whether BM -
or primitive ontology approaches in general - fares conceptually better than
other approaches that do not postulate a primitive ontology of stuff in space-
time in accounting for quantum phenomena and their measurement. We will
hence leave to the reader to go further into this debate, starting from the
claim that BM solves the measurement problem of standard quantum me-
chanics (see, e.g., Maudlin, 1995). Nonetheless, three remarks are in order.
First of all, unlike standard quantum mechanics, BM shifts the accent from
observables to beables, i.e. to stuff that is “out there” irrespective of the fact
that a measurement operation is performed on it or not. More precisely, BM
as described by (1) deals with point-particles which, at each time, have a
definite position in physical space. This is in fact one of the essential moti-
vations behind a primitive ontology approach: dispensing with the need for
an observer. Secondly, equations (1) are totally consistent with a physical
interpretation that does not reify in any way the wave function (by claim-
ing, for example, that it is some sort of physical field), but just accords a
law-like status to it (analogous to the status of the Hamiltonian function in
phase space dynamics).5 It is then an interesting question what metaphysi-
cal stance with respect to laws (e.g. Humeanism, modal realism) fares better
in explaining the role of the wave function in BM (see, e.g., Esfeld et al.,
2014). Thirdly, from what has been already said it follows that BM tells
an ontological story that is clearer than that supplied by standard quantum
mechanics, in that it speaks of physical systems with well-defined properties
(e.g. positions) at each instant of time: in such a theory the role of super-
5Roughly, the analogy resides in the fact that both the wave function in BM and the
Hamiltonian in the phase space formulation of mechanics “generate” through the equations
of motion a vector field in the appropriate space whose integral curves are in fact the
dynamical trajectories of the physical system under scrutiny.
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positions, uncertainties, and collapses is merely mathematical and devoid of
metaphysical import.6
Let us now focus on the very notion of primitive ontology. From the above
presentation, we notice that such a designation conflates (at least) two differ-
ent albeit closely related notions. Firstly, we have “the stuff that is guided”:
in BM, just point-particles. Secondly, we have “what there is”. It is then rea-
sonable to constrain any proper theory falling in the scope of this approach
to make these two meanings compatible.
According to the original aim of this kind of approaches, it seems prima facie
that “primitive ontology” refers to the “stuff things are made of” or, also, to
a “decoration of spacetime” (Allori et al., 2008, p. 11). The reason for this
choice is simple: if everything is made of “primitive stuff” with a minimal set
of properties (e.g. definite positions), then a measurement can be accounted
for just as some sort of “interaction” of elements of such primitive ontology
(e.g. a pointer that points is nothing but a bunch of particles acquiring a
certain spatial configuration as a result of the dynamical evolution of the
global configuration of particles, including the group of particles that form
the measured system). However, if this is the case, then we would imme-
diately see that the term “primitive ontology” would not capture the deep
metaphysical sense of “what there is”. When in fact we talk about a “dec-
oration of spacetime”, we are referring to a pattern of material stuff filling
something, namely, spacetime itself.
The above reasoning shows the need for integrating some (metaphysical and
physical) considerations on space and time in a wider reflection on the status
of primitive ontology approaches to quantum physics. This need becomes all
the more compelling when inquiring into whether such a class of approaches
can do a good job in mitigating or solving the conceptual problems that ac-
company the quest for a quantum theory of gravity. In canonical quantum
gravity, for example, it is also the spacetime of general relativity to be quan-
tized together with material fields, thus making impossible to consider it just
as an inert arena where quantum phenomena take place. Very simply speak-
ing, the absence of such an arena is referred to as background independence.
Since the road to quantum gravity - and to a primitive ontology approach
to quantum gravity - is still long and largely unexplored, here we will main-
6It is worth noting that many authors are not sympathetic to BM exactly because it
brings - paraphrasing Bell (1987) - classical terms into the equations. For these authors
such a move amounts to forcing a “folk” metaphysical reading on quantum phenomena,
which instead should be understood as a radical departure from our everyday picture of
reality. However, this is just a declaration of metaphysical tastes since it does not entail in
any way that the Bohmian approach to quantum physics, because of its intuitive character,
should be empirically inadequate.
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tain a very modest attitude, and we will just start to investigate and assess
the possibility of constructing a non-relativistic Bohmian theory of point-like
particles where “the stuff that is guided” is in fact “all there is”. The most
simple way to do this is to show that equations (1) do not refer to exter-
nal spatial and temporal structures that exist independently of the particle
configuration but, instead, refer to a system of relations instantiated by par-
ticles. Of course, we could just argue in favor of a relationalist interpretation
of (1) simpliciter - for example, following the steps of the remarkable work
made in Huggett (2006) - but that would be an exercise in metaphysics not
likely to have useful consequences in the quest for a Bohmian theory of quan-
tum gravity. Suffices it to say that it is not at all guaranteed that such a
searched-for relational interpretation would carry over to the case of fields.
Having (also) this worry in mind, we will suggest a formal implementation
of a relationalist-like approach to BM which could in principle be extended
to the quantum gravitational regime.
So far, the most promising attempts to construct a purely relational version
of a (classical) theory describing moving point-like particles were carried out
by Julian Barbour and his collaborators.7 In the following, we will first re-
view motivations and results of Barbour’s program, we will then investigate
the possibility of applying this program to standard BM, and we will then
inquire into the metaphysical consequences that a purely relational Bohmian
theory would entail.
2 Barbour’s Program
2.1 Prolegomena
In Newtonian mechanics (NM), the dynamics of a monogenic system8 can be
formulated as an action principle over the space Q×R. Q is the configuration
space, while R models the absolute Newtonian time. The description of the
physical system at each instant is given by a point q ∈ Q. Its evolution is
given by its trajectory q = q(t), which is a function of the time variable
t ∈ R, and which is found by solving the Euler-Lagrange equations, which
follow from the so-called Hamilton’s principle. The principle holds that the
actual path of the system between two fixed end points (t1, t2) is the one that
7In particular, Edward Anderson has later refined and expanded Barbour’s relational
framework while developing a new quantum gravity program. Cf. Anderson (2013) for
his monumental review, which presents the state-of-the-art in relational mechanics and
describes its developments since the inception of the first models.
8That is, a system subjected to a scalar potential that can be a function of coordinates,
velocities, and time.
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renders stationary the action I, which depends on the Lagrangian function
L ≡ L(q, dq
dt
, t):
δI = 0, I =
∫ t2
t1
Ldt.9 (2)
In the case of a system of N -particles we have that Q = R3N , and the sys-
tem is described by Q = {q1, . . . ,qN}, qk = (xk, yk, zk) being the position
of the k-th particle in Euclidean 3-space at a given time relative to a given
coordinate system. Hence, we immediately notice that both NM and BM
are formulated over the same configuration space, although their dynamical
laws are obviously radically different.10
The best-matching framework is an attempt to formulate a “perfect” theory
of dynamics.11 This begs the question: what constitutes a “perfect” for-
mulation of dynamics? In other words, what are the minimum theoretical
requirements for a theory of dynamics to be considered good? One possible
answer is to say that a theory of dynamics must be formulated using only
variables that are physically observable. One could think of this as an appli-
cation of Occam’s razor, namely, that the “perfect” formulation of dynamics
should make use of a minimally necessary set of quantities (i.e. all the phys-
ically observable data only). We can call this the minimalist requirement for
“perfect” dynamics. One could argue that this requirement leads to a strictly
relational dynamics since, empirically, we only observe angles and ratios of
relative distances12 Indeed, this is the line of interpretation taken by Barbour
and his collaborators.13
However, the minimalist requirement is not enough to secure a “perfect” the-
9Usually, the Lagrangian is taken to be the difference T−V between the kinetic and the
potential energies of the system. However, as we will see later, other choices are possible.
10It is worth noting that standard quantum mechanics is already formulated over the
configuration space but only in BM do we see clearly the significance of this fact. This is
because in BM, quantum dynamics is presented in such a way that the parallels between
quantum and classical dynamics can be seen clearly. Of course, this is due to the fact that
BM can be interpreted using beables only, which makes it possible to establish a funda-
mental continuity between quantum and classical dynamics on the meaning of dynamics -
i.e. both are dynamics of point-like particles. The difference between them thus lies only
in the form of the law of dynamics.
11The language of “perfect” dynamics is due to the authors and not to the originators
of the theory. In our view, this language is helpful to bring out the fundamental physical
motivation underlying Barbour’s program, namely, that it is looking for some criteria to
evaluate what constitutes a “perfect” dynamics.
12We observe ratios of relative distances, not relative distances themselves since in mea-
suring an object with a ruler, we are really comparing it to the ruler.
13See Barbour (2012); Mercati (2014), for a technical introduction to Barbour’s pro-
gram, Barbour (1982) for an extensive survey of the philosophical motivations behind the
program, and Anderson (2014b) for a conceptual and technical expansion of the program.
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ory of dynamics. This is because one could imagine formulating a useless
theory using only variables that are physically observable but has no predic-
tive power. It is necessary for any good theory of dynamics to have some
degree of power for empirical prediction. A “perfect” theory should by defini-
tion satisfy this requirement in the best way. One way of implementing this
requirement is to say that a “perfect” theory should be maximally predictive,
that is, it should be able to predict all subsequent motions using only the
initial data that are physically observable.14 A “perfect” theory of dynamics
thus has a minimalist and a maximalist requirement.15
For our purposes, it is important to point out two key premises implicit in
our discussion so far. First, a philosophical notion of “physical observability”
is presupposed in the above approach to understand the minimalist require-
ment. Hence it is assumed that it is possible to differentiate what counts
as physically observable and what does not. Second, granted that if such a
notion of physical observability is available, by setting this as a criterion for
a “perfect” theory of dynamics, one assumes that quantities that are physi-
cally unobservable are redundant theoretical structures that are undesirable
for theories of dynamics.16 These premises are not straightforward and it
seems that for anyone who wishes to motivate the best-matching framework
in the above manner, she is forced to commit to these premises. While we are
sympathetic to some form of the second premise due to our interest in imple-
menting the requirement of background independence,17 the first premise is
particularly difficult for our purposes here because any attempt to construct
a background independent Bohmian theory cannot be smoothly grounded on
notions such as physical observability, since particles’ trajectories in BM are
not observable in the same sense that Newtonian trajectories are.18 Thus
it is not clear whether, philosophically, it is ever possible to implement the
14This requirement is what Barbour calls Poincaré’s principle. For a formulation of this
principle, see Barbour and Bertotti (1982, p. 302).
15The shrewd reader might already object that no “perfect” universal classical theory
of moving point-like particles can recover the full empirical predictions of Newtonian me-
chanics, for that would mean specifying among the initial data the rate of change (in
absolute time) of the orientation of the overall configuration of particles with respect to
absolute space. That would obviously violate the minimalist requirement. We will discuss
this point later.
16It is not obvious why this is the case. For instance, the wave function is not straightfor-
wardly physically observable but according to the most common understanding of standard
quantum mechanics, it is an essential theoretical structure for a successful formulation of
the theory.
17See Vassallo (2015) for a preliminary discussion of the compatibility between Bohmian
dynamics and the requirement of background independence.
18This point is nicely illustrated in Aharonov and Vaidman (1996).
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technical procedure of best-matching to BM without being inconsistent with
its initial motivations.
Fortunately, Barbour also offers another way of interpreting the minimalist
requirement. This is the idea that a “perfect” theory of dynamics should
explain all of physics by geometry, in a purely Cartesian spirit.19 We shall
call it the geometrization of physics. In the concrete case at hand, the ge-
ometrization program would amount to reducing (in a strong formal sense)
the physical description of the particles’ behavior - hence, the dynamics in
primis - to geometrical features of a properly constructed fundamental space.
We will be more explicit on this point in a moment. For now, we just remark
that this interpretation of the minimalist requirement replaces the “purely
observational” interpretation by demanding a “perfect” theory of dynamics
to consist of only minimally necessary geometrical structures. A dynamics
of this sort would be a theory where a minimally necessary amount of geo-
metrical structures is utilized so that it can be maximally predictive. This
alternative formulation of the minimalist requirement allows the Bohmian
theorist to get out of the problem of physical observability. It is perfectly
consistent to commit to Bohmian particles and to require a Bohmian theory
to be maximally predictive with respect to its geometrical structures. What
follows will largely be grounded on this notion of “perfect” dynamics.
Before we venture into the technical construction of the scheme, one last clar-
ification is necessary. While it is perfectly legitimate to pursue a “perfect”
dynamical formulation of BM according to the afore-mentioned principles,
there is a much more direct motivation to adapt the above considerations.
This is the fact that the application of the minimalist requirement in best-
matching leads to a straightforward elimination of absolute space and time
in dynamics. Thus if one finds the search for a “perfect” formulation of dy-
namics appealing, indeed one can adapt the above motivation for applying
best-matching to BM. Nevertheless, a pragmatist could still find the approach
of this paper useful in that ultimately it leads to the elimination of absolute
space and time in BM.
2.2 Implementing the Minimalist and the Maximalist
Requirements
Let us stick for the moment to the classical picture and concretely see how
we can implement a “perfect” dynamics. The first step is to set up a geo-
metrical arena that implements the minimalist requirement. To do so, we
19See Barbour (2003, especially section 1) for this line of interpretation and the historical
details.
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start from the configuration space Q. Q contains certain geometrical sym-
metries specifiable by a Lie group G (for instance, the Euclidean group in
Cartesian 3-space R3). However, in Q, two configurations Q1 and Q2 are
distinct even if one can be generated from the other purely by the action of
G. To fix the ideas, let us consider Euclidean 3-space and fix Q1 to encode
the spatial coordinates of three particles mutually arranged in the shape of
an equilateral triangle. If we take Q2 to be the result of applying a rigid
translation to Q1 we immediately understand that Q1 and Q2 represent two
different embeddings of the same relational configuration in Euclidean space.
This is the sense in which Q does not satisfy the minimalist requirement:
it features configurations which are relationally indistinguishable but still
distinct with respect to some action of G. The proper “minimalist” geomet-
rical arena, call it Q0, would then arise by “quotienting out” the orbits of
G from Q. The metaphysical commitment behind this reasoning is crystal
clear: there is nothing over and above particles and the mutual space-like
relations they stand in that identifies a universal configuration. Therefore,
any description that adds geometrical information to the relational one, e.g.
how a configuration is embedded in Euclidean 3-space, has to be taken as in-
troducing irrelevant extra structure to the picture. Metaphysically speaking,
this stance amounts to adopting a rather strong criterion of indiscernibility
for configurations based on their shape alone.
To see more concretely how this metaphysical attitude is implemented in the
theory, if we start from a 3N dimensional configuration space Q = R3N -
where N ≥ 3 is the number of point particles in the system - we can arrive
at Q0 by successively quotienting Q into the orbits of the action of the group
that consists of translations, rotations and dilations (i.e. homogeneous scal-
ings). First, consider the translations. We can assign all configurations in Q
that are carried into each other by Euclidean translations r ∈ R3 to a common
group orbit of R3, thus decomposing Q into the group orbits of R3. Simi-
larly, we can carry out the same quotienting process for rotations s ∈ SO(3)
and dilations k ∈ H, this latter group being roughly the group of Euclidean
dilations or homothety-translations;20 the group encompassing all the above
transformations is referred to as the similarity group Sim(3) of Euclidean
3-space. In general, the quotienting out operation is highly non-trivial, and
gives rise to a reduced configuration space Q0 = Q/Sim(3) that is a strati-
fied manifold, which, roughly, can be conceived as a “union” of manifolds of
(possibly) different dimensions (the strata).21 We will see later how the non-
20To be precise, uniform scalings are particular cases of homothety transformations.
However, this level of precision is not essential for our purposes.
21See Anderson (2015, especially section 2 and appendix B), for a self-contained techni-
cal discussion of the topic, including field theories. That article makes also clear that the
9
trivial structure of Q0 forces some caveats upon the presented framework; for
the time being we notice that this reduced configuration space represents the
geometrical arena that satisfies a minimalist requirement faithful to the com-
mitment to same-shape indiscernibility. We will call it, following Kendall’s
extensive work on the subject (Kendall et al., 1999), shape space.
The second step is to formulate a predictive dynamics on Q0. The standard
Newtonian dynamics relies on the notion of absolute time. In that case,
dynamics is then formed in Q × R. However, the postulate of a primitive,
fixed “temporal” structure modeled by R once again violates the minimalist
requirement if it is possible to formulate dynamical theories without it.22
Following Lanczos, Barbour realizes that it is indeed possible to formulate
dynamical theories without time using Jacobi’s principle.
Put it simply, Jacobi’s principle 23 is a way of formulating dynamical theories
using a timeless24 variational principle that is parametrized by a λ ∈ R:
δSJ = 0, SJ = 2
∫ λ2
λ1
√
E − V
√
TJdλ, (3)
where TJ =
1
2
∑N
i=1mi
dqi
dλ
dqi
dλ
is the parametrized kinetic energy, V is the po-
tential to which the particles are subjected, and E is the total energy of the
system.
There are two elements to notice about Jacobi’s principle, which are crucial
to our treatment. First, unlike the “t” variable in the standard variational
formulation (2), here the parameter λ is entirely arbitrary since SJ is in-
variant under arbitrary transformations of the form λ → f(λ). The only
requirement is that λ is monotonically increasing, since it has to act as a
“time-like” label. Second, (3) makes manifest the geometrization of the prob-
lem of finding the appropriate dynamics of a N-particle system. If, in fact,
we drop the perspective of Q being a flat space whose line element is the
Euclidean one ds2 =
∑
δijdqidqj, and we adopt a new non-trivial Rieman-
nian structure for it given by ds2 = 2(E−V )TJdλ = (E−V )
∑
miδijdqidqj,
then we immediately realize that (3) is nothing but a geodesic principle on
stratified structure of Q0 carries physical import, so it should be accepted as an unavoid-
able element of (scale-free) relational theories.
22This remark makes manifest the fact that the pursuit of a “perfect” dynamics amounts
to an implementation of spatial and temporal relationalism.
23See Lanczos (1970, pp. 132-140) for a short introduction.
24In the remainder of this section, we will refer to a “timeless” dynamics in the weak sense
of “without absolute time”. We will postpone to section 4 (in particular 4.2) the discussion
of whether this kind of dynamics should be interpreted as giving up time entirely or still
retaining some (weak) temporal structure.
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this curved version of Q.25 The determination of the system’s dynamics is
thus reduced to a purely geometrical problem, i.e. the determination of the
geodesics of the curved configuration space. This point gives rise to an inter-
pretation of Jacobi’s principle more commonly discussed in the literature as
the geometrization of mechanics,26 which provides an insightful way to see
the conceptual continuity between classical mechanics and Einstein’s theory
of general relativity. As we will see in the next section, what is significant
about Barbour’s use of Jacobi’s principle lies in his interpretation of the prin-
ciple within the conceptual framework of best-matching.
What is the relation between the just sketched timeless dynamics and the
standard Newtonian one? As a matter of fact, one can actually easily re-
cover the Newtonian formulation from the above dynamical framework. To
see this, consider that the Jacobi’s principle is formally equivalent to (2) if
we put:
L = 2√E − V
√
TJ . (4)
By performing the variation with respect to the configuration variables, we
get the appropriate Euler-Lagrange equations:
d
dλ
(
∂L
∂(dqi/dλ)
)
=
∂L
∂qi
⇒ d
dλ
(
mi
√
E − V
TJ
dqi
dλ
)
= −
√
TJ
E − V
∂V
∂qi
.
(5)
(5) fixes the structure of canonical momenta:
pi =
∂L
∂(dqi/dλ)
= mi
√
E − V
TJ
dqi
dλ
; (6a)
dpi
dλ
=
∂L
∂qi
= −
√
TJ
E − V
∂V
∂qi
. (6b)
Recall that in this formulation of dynamics, λ is an arbitrary parameter.
Now if we choose λ such that:
TJ
E − V = 1⇒ E = TJ + V, (7)
and we substitute it in (6), then we recover NM with respect to this particular
value of the parameter λ, call it t:
pi = mi
dqi
dt
,
dpi
dt
= −∂V
∂qi
. (8)
25In other words, (E−V ) plays the role of a conformal factor. This of course means that,
in order for the formalism to make sense, such a factor should be well-behaved enough
(e.g. no zeros, infinities, or non-smothnesses).
26See, for example, Lanczos (1970, chapter I section 5, chapter V section 7, and chapter
VIII section 9).
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Let us carefully reflect on the afore-mentioned framework. Recall that we
are considering a universal theory of particles. According to the “orthodox
view” that takes seriously the commitment to absolute time, condition (7) is
not a mere choice, but a pre-existing condition (energy conservation). Conse-
quently, the Jacobi’s principle (3) is just a different way to put the Hamilton’s
principle (2), this latter being the real fundamental principle behind classical
dynamics. On Barbour’s view, the tables are instead turned. If we endorse
the minimalist requirement for a “perfect” dynamics, we cannot but consider
(3) as the fundamental principle of dynamics. From this point of view, (7)
is indeed a mere choice akin to a gauge fixing: NM can be thought of as
a particular choice of parametrized dynamics that gives rise to the simplest
form for the equations of motion. Put it plainly, the relation between time-
less and Newtonian dynamics considered under the light of the minimalist
requirement shows that absolute time can be seen as an emergent quantity
in the context of (particle) dynamics. As Butterfield puts it:
[B]arbour provides examples of theories in which a temporal [...]
metric is emergent in the strong sense of being fully definable
from the rest of the physical theory. So this is emergence in as
strong a sense of reduction as you might want.
(Butterfield, 2002, p. 296)
One of the main reasons for adopting a universal perspective in this frame-
work is now manifest. If, in fact, we consider only subsystems of particles, we
could apply the Jacobi’s principle to each of them separately, obtaining the
same results shown above. However, when coming to fixing the parameter
leading to the simplified equations of motion (8), each system would have its
own condition (7). As a consequence, each subsystem would have its own
clock and, in general, all these “local” clocks would not march in step. Hence,
condition (7) applied to the universe as a whole is the only option that as-
sures that all the subsystems’ clocks will share the same absolute time t.27
We have then achieved a remarkable result, but this is not yet the entire
story. Although Jacobi’s principle as formulated above represents a huge
leap into the implementation of a minimalist dynamics, still it is not enough
for our purposes, at least as it stands right now. This conclusion is quite
obvious, since (3) will get us to a timeless dynamics on Q, not on Q0 (which
is what we need). But is it possible to use a Jacobi-like principle on Q0 to
formulate a predictive dynamics? We will now turn to this problem.
27See Anderson (2013, section 9.6) for a critique of the “marching in step” criterion.
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2.3 The Best-Matching Procedure: Timeless Dynamics
on Q0
The most natural approach is to attempt to write down a Jacobi-like geodesic
principle on Q0 directly based on the “shape” variables q0 ∈ Q0. However,
it turns out that this is extremely difficult.28 A more practical approach is
(i) to define a metric TJBB that measures how much two relational configu-
rations differ, and (ii) to construct such a metric using variables defined on
Q: this approach was first taken by Barbour and Bertotti (1982) and later
refined by Anderson.29 The following presentation will be mainly based on
Anderson (2006, sections 1-2), Anderson (2008a, example 4), and Barbour
(2003, sections 1-4).
Consider two distinct N-particle relational configurations q1
0
, q2
0
∈ Q0. We
can coordinatize them by two Cartesian coordinate frames. Now the first
frame can be laid down in an entirely arbitrary way relative to q1
0
(reflecting,
e.g., the freedom to choose the origin of the frame). To define a “distance” D
between q1
0
and q2
0
, we require that the second frame is laid down relative to q2
0
using infinitesimal G-transformations (G = Sim(3) as discussed in 2.2) such
that δD(δqi) = 0. δqi is the “intrinsic” infinitesimal overlap deficit between
the two configurations; it is given in terms of the Cartesian coordinates qi
plus “G-frame” corrections. More precisely, we have:
δqi = dqi − dA− dB× qi + dC · qi, 30
where A and B are 3-vectors accounting, respectively, for translations and
rotations, while C is an appropriate scaling function. This procedure is aptly
called best-matching because the “distance” between two configurations in Q0
is defined by best-matching the two coordinate frames with respect to each
other.31
28One could attempt to formulate such a dynamics via relative coordinates such as inter-
particle distances rij = |qi − qj |. However, such theories notoriously suffer from predict-
ing anisotropic masses that disagree with empirical observations. See Pooley and Brown
(2002, especially section 6) for a discussion and references.
29See Anderson (2013, sections 1.5-1.8, 2.A) for a technical overview on the evolution
of the formalism (from the original one in Barbour and Bertotti, 1982, which spoiled the
reparametrization invariance of the action, to the one presented here, which fixed the
issue), and Anderson (2008b) for a detailed technical discussion.
30Besides the already mentioned Anderson (2006, 2008a), see also Anderson (2013, sec-
tions 2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2 ) for a discussion of this kind of “differential” and its relation to
Lie derivatives.
31More pictorially, carrying out the procedure for which δD(δqi) = 0 amounts to “jux-
tapose” q2
0
with q1
0
such that they fit in the best way possible. Clearly, in the limit case
where q1
0
and q2
0
represent the same shape, this “juxtaposition” will make them perfectly
overlap: their “distance” is then zero.
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The metric TJBB (where “JBB” stands for “Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti”) that
implements the best-matching procedure by using calculational tools defined
on Q (or, better, on Q× G) is simply:
TJBB =
1
2
N∑
i=1
mi
(
dqi
dλ
− dA
dλ
− dB
dλ
× qi + dC
dλ
· qi
)
·
·
(
dqi
dλ
− dA
dλ
− dB
dλ
× qi + dC
dλ
· qi
)
,
(9)
which is parametrized by the usual λ.
In order to determine the dynamics on Q0, first, we write down the following
variational principle:
δSJBB = 0, SJBB =
∫ √
E − V
√
TJBBdλ.
32 (10)
Then we perform a (free end point) variation with respect to the G-auxiliaries
A,B, C.33 This procedure gives rise to the following four constraints. First
of all, we note that the best-matched momenta have the same form of (6a),
that is, they are “direction cosines” with respect to the kinetic metric TJBB
multiplied by the term (E−V ). Hence, not all the momenta are independent
(intuitively, we will have groups of momenta “pointing in the same direction”
modulo a common factor), and this fact is encoded in the first constraint:
1
2
N∑
i=1
pi · pi
mi
− E + V = 0. (11)
The second constraint arises from the variation of A It amounts to the van-
ishing of the total momentum of the system:34
P =
N∑
i=1
pi = 0. (12)
32TJBB is homogeneous of degree 2, while E-V must be homogeneous of degree −2 (see
(14)). As Anderson notes (Anderson, 2013, section 2.3.2), since we are dealing with a
scale-invariant theory, it would be far more geometrically natural to render both terms
homogeneous of degree 0 by, respectively, dividing and multiplying by the total moment of
inertia I. However, as Anderson himself acknowledges, the form (10) is the mechanically-
natural one, since TJBB, E, and V bear the usual physical units (I acting in this context
just as a constant “conversion factor” between the two formulations). We then prefer to
stick to this latter representation, which will make clearer the extension of the framework
to BM discussed in section 3.
33See Anderson (2007, 2014a) for two fully worked-out models involving this for-
malism. Earlier work on “Barbour-Bertotti” models include, notably, Gergely (2000);
Gergely and McKain (2000).
34All the three relations (12), (13), (14), hold in the center-of-mass frame.
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This condition implies that the system is isolated, which is consistent with
the universal perspective adopted in the framework. Such a condition is
propagated if the potential V is invariant under spatial translations.
The third constraint answers the objection briefly considered in footnote
15. It is a consequence of B-variation and states that the total angular
momentum of the system vanishes:
J =
N∑
i=1
qi × pi = 0. (13)
(13) explains why the present framework is maximally predictive even if the
initial data required do not include any information regarding the orientation
of the system in absolute space. In this case, to secure the propagation of
the constraint, the potential V has to be invariant under rotations, which is
the case if it is a function of the interparticle separations.
The fourth constraint (arising from C-variation) gives rise to the most un-
intuitive consequences. It amounts to the vanishing of a quantity that, in
analogy with the former designations, we can call dilational momentum:
D =
N∑
i=1
pi · qi = 0. (14)
Condition (14) is consistent with the framework if V is homogeneous of de-
gree −2 in the positional variables and the total energy E vanishes in the
“Newton” gauge.35 The consequence of these restrictions is, indeed, remark-
able: motions for which V = const. and E > 0 - that is, inertial motions -
are not allowed. Barbour stresses this fact as follows:
It is in this sense that inertia violates scaling. There is no max-
imally predictive inertial dynamics on shape space. One cannot
formulate a theory of pure inertial motion without introducing
additional kinematic structure - an absolute scale of length - that
mathematical intuition suggests one should not employ. [I]f one
wishes to have any dynamics at all on shape space that satisfies
the Poincaré criterion, it must include forces and have vanishing
energy.
(Barbour, 2003, p. 1546, Barbour’s emphases)
We will see later how the very last sentence in the above quotation can ac-
quire a new sense in a Bohmian framework.
35The concrete calculations are carried out in Barbour (2003, section 2).
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In the end, by solving the constraints, one can eliminate the G-auxiliaries
from the action (10), thus finding the “real” geodesic principle on Q0. We
are now in the position of applying the same exact reasoning behind Jacobi’s
principle that led from (3) to (5). The final result consists of equations of mo-
tion of the same form as (5). Also in this case, by fixing the “Newton” gauge
through a condition analogous to (7), we get the usual Newtonian equations
(8). Therefore, in the case of a timeless dynamics in shape space, we have
that both spatial and temporal degrees of freedom of NM are recovered by
applying the variational principle (10) and then fixing the “Newton” gauge
λ → t. This is the strong formal sense in which Newtonian space and time
are reduced to the geometrical features of Q0.
However, some technical caveats are required at this point. The first is that
no usual Newtonian potential is compatible with (14), since normally - e.g.
in the gravitational case - they are homogeneous of degree minus one. This
is not by itself an insurmountable problem since, as discussed in Anderson
(2013, section 5.1.2), it is always possible to find some mathematical trick
that mimics the form of the most usual classical potentials. However, this sort
of trickery might lead to unwanted physical restrictions, such as no angular
momentum exchange between subsystems. This point is of course delicate,
and we will see that the Bohmian context fully inherits this conceptual prob-
lem.
The second caveat regards the implementation of a geodesic principle on a
general shape space. Given, in fact, that the global geometry of such a space
is that of a stratified manifold, it is problematic to rigorously account for a
dynamical evolution whose related geodesic trajectory hits different strata
of Q0 (see Anderson, 2015, section 9.4 and references mentioned therein, for
discussion). This means that the above described framework works well in a
suitably small region of Q0, but might break down on a larger scale, depend-
ing on the particular geometrical structure of Q0.
To recap: the best-matching framework in the version presented here repre-
sents an attempt at reducing Newtonian dynamics to a more fundamental
theory where absolute space and time play no relevant role. The sense of
reduction intended is very strong, i.e. a purely formal one: best-matching
treats all the degrees of freedom which are not intrinsic to a universal con-
figuration of particles (i.e. that are not given in terms of ratios of distances
and angles), hence in primis spatial and temporal degrees of freedom, as
mere gauge. This separation of degrees of freedom into physical and gauge
is justified by the constraints (11), (12), (13), and (14) arising from the im-
plementation of the Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti’s principle on shape space. As
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a result the J = 0 subsector of NM is recovered36 from the underlying best-
matching theory via a gauge fixing that sets a privileged temporal metric
and a privileged length scale, from which inertial motions can be recovered
(at least in sufficiently small regions of shape space). This also explains in
what sense the best-matching dynamics can be considered as maximally pre-
dictive. Moreover, the fact that the dynamics is implemented as a geodesic
principle over a curved Riemannian space (viz. shape space) represents a
genuine reduction of all the salient dynamical features to geometrical ones:
in this sense, the theory exhibits a dynamics that satisfies the minimalist
requirement.
2.4 Quantization
There are currently a number of quantization procedures proposed for rela-
tional models, which, in some cases, were completed in detail (see Anderson,
2013, sections 13-16 for extensive discussion and detailed calculations):
Anderson and Kneller (2014); Anderson and Franzen (2010); Barbour et al.
(2013) are notable examples. However, none of these - to our knowledge
- were carried out in a primitive ontology framework (one exception being
Koslowski, 2014, appendix A).
Here we just note that, if a “perfect” dynamics is a timeless theory or, better,
a reparametrization invariant theory, then the canonical quantization of such
a theory will give rise to a static universal wave equation.37 To see this, it is
sufficient to note that the canonical procedure for quantizing the theory will
comprise the implementation of the constraints (11), (12), (13), and (14) as
restrictions over the physically allowed wave functions.38 For example, the
canonical quantization of the constraint (11) will straightforwardly give rise
to a time-independent Schrödinger equation:
HˆΨ = EΨ. (15)
In other words, the wave equation just takes definite values of E for each
configuration of the system. Imposing the other quantum constraints would
further restrict the allowed universal wave functions to those that are eigen-
functions of the Hamiltonian operator with energy eigenvalue E=0. In the
36We note that nothing speaks against the possibility of constructing a classical the-
ory that accounts for global J 6= 0 effects in terms of change in the spatial relations of
particles only. Of course, such a theory would exhibit a mathematical structure far more
complicated than the present one.
37See Barbour (1994a), Kiefer (2004, sections 3.1 and 3.4). However, as we will see in
section 4, not everybody agrees on this.
38Unless they are solved prior to quantization, which would lead to the same result
considered above.
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end - and not surprisingly - we see that there are compelling arguments in
favor of the fact that a canonically quantized version of the theory considered
above would exhibit a timeless dynamics dictated by a Wheeler-DeWitt-like
equation:39
HˆΨ = 0. (16)
As we shall argue, this outcome in actual fact unifies the perspective of
Bohmian and Barbour’s programs in a powerful way. This is because on the
Bohmian view adopted here, that is the one that takes the wave function as a
law-like element of the formalism,40 a static wave equation from the universal
perspective is exactly what one should expect.
Since the above overview have provided the reader with enough information
on the best-matching procedure and its quantization, we can now turn to BM
and see (i) how this framework might - or might not - apply in this context
(the next section), and (ii) what are the possible metaphysical consequences
of a fully worked out relational Bohmian theory of particles (section 4).
3 Relational Bohmian Mechanics: A Brief Sketch
If we agree that best-matching is a really promising framework in developing
a truly relational mechanics - at least, but not only, for particle mechanics
- it is then interesting to investigate whether pursuing a relational Bohmian
particle theory might profit from adopting such a framework. Indeed the
Barbour and Bohmian approaches share a common “universal” perspective:
the aim of both approaches is to end up with a theory that describes the
entire universe as a unique (“undivided”) system and then seek to recover the
description of a subsystem of it as a suitable approximation of the behavior
of this part with respect to the rest of the system. To be fair, however, the
two approaches have to appeal to such a universal perspective for different
reasons. In Barbour there is the need for a description of motions that is max-
imally predictive albeit disregarding a huge part of Newtonian initial data
(especially angular velocity), while in Bohm there is the need to account for
the appearance of a collapse of the wave function of a subsystem while retain-
ing the globally non-local behavior of the system. It is remarkable that such
original motivations are not only compatible, but even similar: both, in fact,
are intended to account for the appearance of certain well-known features
(e.g., absolute time, quantum collapses) at the level of subsystems while, in
39For a detailed technical discussion of the quantization of theories that dispense with
space and time as fundamental notions, see Doldan et al. (1996).
40A presentation and defense of this view can be found in Goldstein and Zanghì (2013).
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fact, denying the fundamental reality of such features. Having explained the
motivation for pursuing a relational dynamics for Bohmian particles in the
introduction, and having showed the virtues (and vices) of a relational me-
chanics based on best-matching in the previous section, we can now focus on
a concrete proposal on how to implement a relational version of BM (RBM,
for short) based on best-matching.
The most obvious strategy to create a relational quantum theory of N point-
like particles that satisfies the minimalist and the maximalist requirements
would be to quantize the classical best-matched theory in the way suggested
at the end of section 2.4, thus ending up with a Wheeler-DeWitt-like equa-
tion on the relational configuration space Q0. At this point, in order to “go
Bohmian”, we should first of all realize that the theory whose dynamics is en-
coded in (16) suffers from the standard conceptual problems arising both in
quantum physics in general, and in particular in those theories constructed by
canonically quantizing reparametrization invariant classical theories. Among
these issues, we might mention the problem of making sense of superpositions
or collapses of the universal wave function, and the problem of extracting a
non-trivial dynamics from a timeless equation of the form (16). In this con-
text, appealing to the insights that the Bohmian theory might give to this
theory is a legitimate move even if, obviously, it is not the only one possible!41
After having argued that a Bohmian approach might be useful in this context,
we could proceed by constructing a relational guiding equation for the N -
particle system: this methodology would closely resemble the non-relational
one adopted in Dürr et al. (1992, section 3), which consists in setting up a
velocity field vΨ = dQ
dt
over R3N depending on the wave function selected
by the Schrödinger equation, which satisfies a number of symmetry condi-
tions such as Galilean invariance and equivariance.42 However, a moment
of reflection shows that applying this strategy in the present case would not
be so straightforward as it should prima facie seem. First of all, it would be
practically impossible to work directly with the “shape coordinates” available
in Q0 (see Barbour, 2003, section 4, for a clear statement in this sense). Sec-
ondly an important amount of work should be done to show that (at least)
a reparametrization invariant “velocity” field vΨ0 = δQ
δλ
can be defined over
Q0, which is (i) compatible with the Wheeler-DeWitt-like equation (16), and
(ii) selects geodesic trajectories over Q0. Thirdly, it should have to be shown
how from these two purely relational equations we could recover the standard
41Goldstein and Teufel (2001) provide a clear review of the conceptual pros of going
Bohmian in the context of a canonically quantized theory, especially in quantum canonical
general relativity.
42More precisely, the velocity field should be chosen such that the probability distribu-
tion |Ψ|2 is equivariant with respect to it.
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Schrödinger equation plus the guiding equation of BM by fixing a particular
value for the parameter λ. These remarks are not meant to suggest that
pursuing this strategy would necessarily lead to no or wrong results, but to
motivate the search for an alternative simpler methodology. In our opinion
such a simpler strategy is available and can be arrived at by the following
reasoning: since the subject matter of BM is basically the same of classical
mechanics, namely the description of point-like particles moving in Euclidean
3-space at an absolute time rate, and given that the dynamics of BM obeys
the same dynamical symmetry conditions of classical mechanics, why don’t
we try to arrive at a version of RBM by straightforwardly applying best-
matching to standard BM? This is the program that we are going to sketch
in the remainder of this section.
In order to pursue our strategy, we need first of all to bring about as much
as possible the similarities between classical mechanics and BM. We start,
then, by reformulating (1) in a different albeit equivalent manner, namely,
the way it was originally proposed in Bohm (1952a,b) and thoroughly devel-
oped, e.g., in Holland (1993). This is done by considering two real functions
R(Q, t) and S(Q, t) over R3N ×R such that, given a solution Ψ(Q, t) of (1a),
it is the case that Ψ = ReiS.43 Substituting this latter form of Ψ in (1a) and
separating the real and imaginary parts of the resulting formula, we end up
with the following two coupled relations:
∂S
∂t
+
N∑
i=1
(∇iS)2
2mi
+ V + V = 0, (17a)
∂R2
∂t
+
N∑
i=1
∇i
(
R2
∇iS
mi
)
= 0. (17b)
Since our starting theory is (1), that is a non-relativistic theory of N point-
like particles, what we have done is basically to rewrite it as a Hamilton-
Jacobi theory. We see this by looking at (17a) and recognizing that it be-
comes the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of our system if we assume that the k-th
particle velocity is ∇kS
mk
. Under this reading, (17b) states the conservation of
R2 = |Ψ|2 along the particles’ trajectories. Pursuing this classical analogy
leads to the introduction of a further “quantum” potential of the form:
V = −
N∑
i=1
1
2mi
∇2iR
R
. (18)
43Here we gloss over the boundary and continuity conditions that must be placed to
ensure that Ψ - and hence also S and R - is physically meaningful.
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The reason why we call it a potential becomes manifest if we derive (17a)
with respect of ∇k, thus arriving at a “Newtonian-like” equation of motion
for the k-th particle, which reads:
mk
d2qk
dt2
= −∇k
(
V + V).44 (19)
It is extremely important to clarify that our interest in adopting this New-
tonian disguise for BM is purely formal and does not entail that we are
committing us to things such as quantum forces exerted by some kind of
Ψ-field. Our commitments remain firmly those compatible with the version
of the theory given by (1), which in particular means that we are not reify-
ing Ψ in any way.45 However, the advantage of casting BM in a Newtonian
form should be clear to the reader, since now we can repeat for this theory -
mutatis mutandis - the same reasoning that, in the previous section, led to
a best-matched version of classical mechanics. In the present case, the key
physical quantities that enter best matching are the kinetic energy:
T =
1
2
N∑
i=1
mi
dqi
dt
dqi
dt
=
N∑
i=1
(∇iS)2
2mi
, (20)
and the total potential energy:
V = V −
N∑
i=1
1
2mi
∇2iR
R
. (21)
The first delicate point is to choose the appropriate set of symmetries with
respect to which perform the best-matching procedure. Since both T and
V are Galilean invariant,46 we can best-match these quantities with respect
to the same gauge group Sim(3) used for classical mechanics (but nothing
prevents us from considering a different or more extended gauge group, if
needed). However, note that in this case, the kinetic energy (20) has in
general a non-trivial form due to its dependence on the square of the spatial
gradient of the wave function’s phase S. This complication is needed in order
to implement into the theory the requirement that the velocity of the particles
44It is possible to arrive at the very same expression by differentiating (1b) with respect
to time, which stresses the fact that the two formalisms are equivalent.
45Otherwise, one of our key motivations for pursuing this program, i.e. finding a
Bohmian theory of N -particles with a more parsimonious and coherent ontology than
the standard one, would be betrayed.
46See Holland (1993, section 3.11) for a discussion of the invariance properties of the
theory (17).
21
depends on the spatial gradient of S (otherwise equation (19) would select
a broader class of motions than those allowed by (1)). The first conceptual
issue thus reads:
Conceptual Issue 1 Is it possible to construct a kinetic metric of the form
(9) from (20)?
A detailed answer to this question would require a technical paper on its
own. Since our purpose here is, much more modestly, to show that RBM is
not a priori impossible to construct, we will be content to point out a case in
which the answer to the above question is positive: this very simply happens
when the phase does not depend on time. Clearly, when the phase has this
form, then the right hand side of (20) will not depend on time as well, and it
would be easy to implement best-matching by putting the whole expression
in the form (9). Actually, one may have thought of a broader class of phases,
namely those for which the positions and time dependencies are separable,
that is, S(Q, t) = S ′(Q) − Et, with E the total energy of the system in the
“Newton” gauge. However, this class of phases are not consistent with the
requirement of the total energy of the system being zero in the “Newton”
gauge.
The conceptual issue 1 is not the only one we would face when trying to
implement a “Bohmian” Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti principle as in the classical
case. The second issue, in fact, regards how to construct the conformal factor√E −V that “bends” the kinetic metric TJBB, thus generating a non-trivial
timeless dynamics on Q0 (modulo the caveats discussed at the end of section
2.3 and in footnote 25):
Conceptual Issue 2 Is it possible to construct a conformal factor of the
form
√E −V in order to implement a geodesic principle resembling (10)?
Also in this case, the generic form of (21) does not permit a quick answer.
This is obviously because the additional quantum part (18) of the potential
introduces a highly non-trivial dependence on the wave’s amplitude R(Q, t)
and its second spatial derivatives. To solve this issue, two different routes
can be taken. The first, and most perilous, is to modify the Jacobi principle
as follows. Since this principle singles out the geodesics of the shape space
Q0, intended as a curved Riemannian manifold, a possible strategy would be
to include the “quantum” part of the potential as characterizing some non-
trivial metrical property of this space other than its curvature: for example,
its torsion. This strategy would require a relevant amount of work to be
carried out, but nothing prevents it a priori from being successful. The second
strategy would more simply amount to considering all the relevant cases and
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check by calculation if the Jacobi principle can be effectively implemented.
Also in this case, considering amplitudes R(Q, t) = R′(Q) that do not depend
on time would do the job, at least when best-matching (21) with respect to
translations and rotations. However, when considering scale invariance, the
problem becomes extremely delicate:
Conceptual Issue 3 Is it possible to construct a total potential W ≡W(V)
which is homogeneous of degree −2 but, at the same time, gives rise to an
equation of motion of the form (19) in an appropriate limit?
This issue seems the most compelling among the three we pushed forward so
far, but it is also the one more likely to bring new physics into the picture,
independently of the final answer to the question. In case it turned out
that this issue cannot be solved, then we should surrender to the fact that
BM can be given at best only a “mild” relationalist implementation, where
inertial effects cannot be fully reduced to geometric facts holding in shape
space, but we would also gain some insight on the possible quantum aspects
at the roots of inertia. On the other hand, if the question could be answered
in the positive, then the discrepancies between the “real” universal dynamics
encoded in W and the “observed” one encoded in V would most likely be
based on new testable physical assumptions about the universe.
To conclude this section, we should consider a fourth issue which, in some
sense, summarizes the previous three:
Conceptual Issue 4 Assuming that a version of RBM is actually imple-
mentable, how much of BM could be recoverable from it?
If RBM could be implemented, then according to the constraint (11), and
the condition that the total energy of the system should vanish in the “New-
ton” gauge, we would obtain a Hamilton-Jacobi equation (17a) of the form
∂S
∂t
= 0. This would be entirely consistent with the simple solution of the
conceptual issue 1 proposed above. As regards the amplitude R, however,
the constraints do not straightforwardly select any of its characteristic fea-
tures47 (which enforces the considerations made about the conceptual issue
2). Anyway, if we expect RBM to be consistent with the “timelessness” of
a reparametrization invariant quantum theory, then it is likely that also R
would turn out to be a function independent of time. In other words, RBM
47Nonetheless, R does have a general distinctive feature that might be interesting in this
context, that is, the fact that it influences the form of the quantum potential (18) modulo
a multiplicative constant (i.e. V does not change under transformations R→ kR, k ∈ R).
This means that the physical information encoded in R which determines (18) is insensitive
to scaling transformations.
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would recover the sector of BM with stationary (superpositions of) wave
functions corresponding to zero total energy of the system. The fact that
the standard best-matching framework would not recover the full content of
BM is not by itself a problem. Even the best-matched theory based on (10)
was not able to recover the full Newtonian dynamics but this is not an issue
insofar as the theory provides a physically significant motivation for leaving
out part of the standard dynamical picture. In the present case, if RBM
would recover the sector of (1) with (1a) given by HˆΨ = 0, it would be a
welcome and relevant result. This is because having accorded to the universal
wave function a law-like status, we would expect it not to change over time.
However, all of this remains mere speculation as long as a concrete model
along these lines is not implemented.
4 The Metaphysics of Relational Bohmian Me-
chanics
4.1 Ontology
Although the technical implementation of the non-relativistic particle dy-
namics of RBM is still work in progress, the sketch of such a theory devel-
oped in the previous section is physically informed enough to be the object
of a fruitful philosophical analysis. In particular, it would be of enormous
interests for philosophers to dig into the metaphysics of RBM.
With this respect, the first point to highlight is that RBM succeeds in ques-
tioning the fundamentality of the dynamical picture of particles changing
position in space at different times. RBM’s dynamics talks about sequences
of instantaneous particle configurations and not about the temporal develop-
ment of a “swarm” of particles deployed over physical space. Let us discuss
in detail what the metaphysical significance of this picture might be.
The first step to take is to settle for two key elements postulated by the
theory, that is, (i) the stuff that is guided, and (ii) what there is. As re-
gards (i), we can say that in RBM the stuff guided still consists of particles.
However, while in BM the (time-dependent) wave function “choreographed”
the motion of the particles through the guiding equation (1b), as resulting
from the integral curve of the vector field generated in standard configuration
space by (1b), in the latter case the new dynamics determines a trajectory
in the relational configuration space that in no way can be immediately and
univocally “decomposed” in single particles’ trajectories in spacetime. In the
case of RBM, then, the only thing we can say is that the “choreographic”
role of the (time-independent) wave function consists in selecting universal
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configurations of particles and ordering them along a trajectory in relational
configuration space. Formally, this is achieved by virtue of the fact that the
amplitude and the phase of the wave function enter the geodesic principle
(10), thus determining the geometrical features of the shape space Q0. To
put it simply, one of the main aims of the RBM program is to supplant
“choreography” with geometry according to the minimalist requirement, thus
making it simpler to argue against the view that the particles are literally
“pushed” by some kind of field. However, we cannot fully understand this
point as long as we do not clarify what is the meaning of (ii), i.e. how RBM
answers the question regarding what there is at the fundamental ontological
level.
Let us start from what there is not according to RBM: there is no set of
individual loci perduring in an objective universal time flow (Newtonian ab-
solute space and time), nor there is a subsisting set of places-at-a-time called
neo-Newtonian spacetime.48 All there is consists of bits of matter (particles)
standing in spatial relations among them: take, say, N particles, arrange
them in an array of spatial relations, and you get a point in Q0. This point
does not represent a snapshot of a universe with a swarm of N particles in
space at a given time, rather, it defines what it means to be “universal” and
what it means to be “instantaneous”. The dynamics of the theory, then, es-
tablishes an ordering of such configurations in the form of a smooth sequence
of points (that is, a curve) in Q0 labelled by an arbitrary monotonically
increasing parameter, such that this curve satisfies the principle (10). It is
very important to note that such a dynamics is non-local in a clear sense: the
occurrence of a universal instantaneous configuration depends on the prece-
dent configuration as a whole, that is, there is no way to extract exact (viz.
non-approximated) dynamical information from parts of a configuration.
The ontology of the theory is now quite clear: at the fundamental level there
are particles and an irreflexive and symmetric relation R that is spatial in
nature, which means that a “coloring” positive-real-valued function f can be
defined in the domain of R such that, for each couple of relata, it assigns
a value empirically interpretable as a Euclidean distance.49 This relation
makes it also possible to define a notion of “coexistence”: two particles a and
b are coexistent just in case aRb. The notion of configuration can be thus
clarified in terms of coexistence, in the sense that a configuration is nothing
48Actually, there is no consensus over whether the spatial and temporal structures en-
tering the dynamics of BM should be best understood as standard absolute space and
time or a neo-Newtonian 4-dimensional structure. For simplicity’s sake, we gloss over this
further issue.
49Of course, such a function is not unique nor objective, since it depends on an arbitrary
fixing of the spatial scale.
25
but a set of coexisting particles. Instead, the dynamical path established in
shape space can be interpreted as a strict ordering relation C among configu-
rations. This clarifies why, also in the relational case, there is no need in the
ontology for the wave function as a concrete physical object. The dynamical
picture, in fact, can be either interpreted in Humean terms, hence taking the
best-matched stack of configurations as a mosaic on which the dynamical
laws supervene, or in a modal realist fashion, claiming for example that each
configuration in a curve is a causal structure possessing the power to bring
about the subsequent one. Note that, while the modal realist would natu-
rally interpret C as some sort of causal linkage among the configurations, the
Humean cannot accord such an ontological status to the relation, although,
in order to make sense of the mosaic in pre-spatiotemporal terms, she still
needs to accord C some degree of reality. Furthermore, since in RBM the role
of the wave function in generating the dynamics is encoded in the geometrical
features of shape space, the absence of commitments to the wave function as
a real object can be translated in this context as the absence of commitments
to Q0 as a real fundamental space. Under this light, Barbour’s quotation at
the end of section 2.3, assumes a new and more intriguing meaning. The
scale invariance requirement in the Bohmian case (i.e. V 6= 0) can be imple-
mented even in the absence of classical forces (V = 0) as long as the particles
exhibit a quantum behavior (V 6= 0). The case where classical forces “cancel
out” the quantum behavior is instead forbidden.
Let us now consider in more detail the appearance of space and time from
this picture. From what has been showed in the previous sections, it is clear
that both concepts are reduced in a strong formal sense to the fundamental
structures posited by the theory. However, RBM does not fully dispense
with spatial and temporal concepts at the fundamental level, although their
characterization is sensibly weaker than those we are accustomed to in BM.
As regards space, we saw that the fundamental relation taking particles as
relata is still spatial in nature, since it can be used to characterize a shape,
so we can say that at least a conformal structure is still postulated. In the
case of time, instead, we notice that (i) the usual notion of instantaneous
configuration can be reduced to that of coexisting particles, and (ii) that C
provides a strict ordering for configurations. Hence, we are here confronted
with an ordering of “instants” which is very similar to a B-series of time50
for two main reasons. The first is that, due to the monotonicity requirement
for λ, in this picture there is a clear sense in which a given instantaneous
configuration comes after a precedent one: this ordering plus a choice of a
privileged parametrization of the dynamical curve is the supervenience basis
50This terminology is of course borrowed from McTaggart (1908).
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on which the appearance of universal time is grounded. The second is that
such a picture denies temporal becoming since there is nothing coming to
and passing from existence: all there is is a sequence of configurations which
can be seen either as a bare “Humean block” or as encoding some modal
facts of the matter such as “the subsequent configuration would not have
existed having the precedent been different”. It is interesting to note that
the metaphysical picture just discussed echoes the Leibnizian view of space
as the order of coexisting things, and time as a successive order of things: in
a sense, the relations R and C represent an implementation of these ideas.
Together with the afore-mentioned metaphysical basis for the appearance of
time in this context comes a notion of particle’s identity over time. Actually,
the characterization of a configuration as a set of coexisting particles just
requires a primitive notion of numerical identity in order to make particles
weakly discernible underR. Such a notion of discernibility is of course needed
when two shapes are best-matched, because this procedure is basically an at-
tempt to make two shapes overlap particle by particle. Note, however, that
at this stage we are not forced to claim that two juxtaposed particles rep-
resent the same particle. Once the dynamical best-matching procedure is
finally carried out in accordance to the geodesic principle (10), and a set of
juxtaposed shapes is stacked into a curve in Q0, then we can apply the above
discussed metaphysical account for the appearance of a temporal ordering
among configurations: it is exactly this derived ordering to ground the no-
tion of spatiotemporal trajectory and, hence, that of particle’s identity over
time.51
To summarize, RBM replaces the usual Bohmian commitment to fundamen-
tal entities being particles, absolute space, and absolute time, with a more
parsimonious ontology of particles plus two fundamental relations R and C.
In the RBM case “what is guided” and “what there is” can be taken as syn-
onyms, since there are no elements of the primitive ontology that do not enter
the dynamical evolution. In this sense, the RBM program can be taken as a
recipe to construct a genuinely background independent theory.
An open metaphysical problem stemming from the above analysis is what
kind of metaphysical priorities we should assign to objects (particles) and
relations. With this respect, we suggest that the ontology of RBM is best
understood in moderate ontic structuralists terms. Quoting Esfeld and Lam
(2008):
According to this position, neither objects nor relations (struc-
ture) have an ontological priority with respect to the physical
world: they are both on the same footing, belonging both to the
51Formally speaking, this amounts to recovering (19) from the RBM’s version of (5).
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ontological ground floor. It makes no sense to assign an onto-
logical priority to objects, because instead of having fundamen-
tal intrinsic properties, there are only the relations in which they
stand. In other words, an object as such is nothing but that what
bears the relations. As regards the relations, it makes no sense
to attribute an ontological priority to them, for at least insofar as
they exist in the physical world, they exist as relations between
objects. In sum, as far as the physical world is concerned, there
is a mutual ontological as well as conceptual dependence between
objects and structure (relations): objects can neither exist nor
be conceived without relations in which they stand, and relations
can neither exist in the physical world nor be conceived as the
structure of the physical world without objects that stand in the
relations.
(ibid., pp. 31,32)
In the case of RBM, according - say - an ontological priority to particles over
R would not explain why some of them coexist in a configuration and some
other of them coexist in another one; that is, there would be nothing inherent
into the single particles that would explain this diversification in different
configurations. On the other hand, claiming thatR is prior to particles would
raise the question of what would make configurations physical as opposed
to mere abstract structures; of course, requiring that a physical relation
should take concrete objects (in fact, particles) as relata, would answer the
question, but this move is obviously precluded to a proponent of this radical
form of structuralism. In both cases, then, a moderate form of structuralism
would defuse the objections. Moreover, taking configurations as concrete
structures would help grounding the non-local dynamical behavior encoded
in C in a “holistic” causal property that is borne by configurations as a whole,
being it obviously unexplainable in terms of intrinsic properties of particles
(otherwise, there wouldn’t be any real non-locality involved).
4.2 Time from the Quantum
The above metaphysical analysis of RBM shares a lot of traits with that of
a best-matching theory of classical particles. This is a key point we want to
stress: exactly like BM, RBM represents a quantum theory that brings “clas-
sical terms” in the equations, and such an ontological clarity makes it possible
to overcome a very important problem in quantum relational physics. One
of the most important results that the RBM program promises to deliver is,
in fact, that this theory would yield a well-established and easy to interpret
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mechanism which provides a fundamental ordering of instantaneous configu-
rations in a quantum context. Indeed, in the “standard” relational context,
recovering even a weak notion of time (or the appearance thereof) from the
Wheeler-DeWitt-like equation (16) alone is quite difficult. Let us try to as-
sess two philosophically interesting proposals for the emergence of time from
a quantum relational context,52 and point out how RBM provides a better
framework for the explanation of the appearance of time from the quantum
level.
The first proposal is due to Barbour himself and involves the notion of “time
capsule” (Barbour, 1994b).53 For Barbour, the fact that the quantization of
a classical relational theory leads to a frozen dynamics in terms of a Wheeler-
DeWitt-like equation is a strong hint of the fact that a quantum relational
theory must be timeless simpliciter, i.e. it must not allow for whatever or-
dering, as weak as it might be (let alone, of course, temporal becoming).
In order to provide a consistent story of how a quantum relational theory
works and how we get the impression of there being change in time, Barbour
focuses on the relational configuration space Q0 and accords actual existence
to the whole space. What exists is not an actual history (or some collection
of consistent histories), but a plurality of “nows” as given by instantaneous
universal configurations of particles. It happens that some of these nows are
structured so that they seem to contain “records” of other nows. Just to
clarify the ideas, think of a series of footsteps on the sand: this is intuitively
a record of someone having walked on the beach. By the same token, there
might be a now in which a bunch of particles are mutually arranged in a
cloud-chamber-like configuration with some α-like tracks in it: this might
suggest that this now contains a record of another one which is identical
to the former except for the fact that, in the chamber, there is a radioac-
tive atomic nucleus which is likely to perform α-decay. However, unlike our
intuitive notion of record as some physical consequence of certain past con-
ditions, the records in Barbour’s framework are just some sort of suggestive
similarities that happen to hold between nows, without any real link connect-
52Which by no means exhaust the list of strategies for accounting for time in a quantum
relational setting. Anderson (2013, sections 20-26) gives a detailed overview of the state-
of-the-art in this field: interestingly enough, primitive ontology approaches seem not to be
particularly considered in current research, which further motivates the present article.
53It is worth noting that Barbour’s proposal was made at a stage in which there was not
enough knowledge of shape spaces’ geometry (i.e. before work like in Anderson, 2015, was
carried out). For this reason, we intend Barbour’s proposal as a heuristically presented
possibility with no detailed mechanism offered (see Anderson, 2009, for a discussion on
the general approach to records theory in physics). However, what interest us here are the
metaphysical implications of Barbour’s proposal, independently on its actual (or possible)
technical implementation.
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ing these two configurations. Under this view, we basically “live” in a time
capsule so complex that the particles are arranged in brain-experiencing-
temporal-becoming-like configurations. The role of the wave function in this
picture is to assign the highest quantum-mechanical probability to those con-
figurations that seem to encode records of the past. Such a mechanism is
reminiscent of the analysis made in Mott (1983) of the formation of tracks
in a cloud chamber due to the α-decay of an atomic nucleus. The problem
considered in the paper is the following: if the wave function of an α-particle
being emitted by the nucleus is spherically symmetric, how can it be possi-
ble that the interaction with the atoms in the chamber produces a straight
track? To cut the story short, Mott described the physical setting in terms
of a time-independent Schrödinger equation and he was able to show that
such a description assigns the highest probabilities to ionization patterns be-
ing straight lines. Barbour aims at extending such an analysis to relational
configuration space and adding the caveat that the records encoded in the
“privileged” configurations are not in fact consequences of “previous happen-
ings”.
Barbour’s conceptual account of time capsules is complex to spell out in de-
tail (we recommend Butterfield, 2002, especially section 3, and Ismael, 2002,
for a thorough philosophical discussion of Barbour’s views) but the main
idea is clear: all possible universal instantaneous configurations are equally
real and there is no thing such as a history, i.e. a curve connecting a sub-
set of them. There are many objections - epistemological and metaphysical
- that can be raised against Barbour’s account of time capsules. Here we
would like to consider just one of them, which has an immediate connec-
tion with RBM, and takes the form of a very simple question: what is the
status of the wave function in the time-capsule picture? If the answer is
that the wave function is merely an assignment of probabilities to time cap-
sules, then the subsequent question is: probabilities for what? According
to all the major physical accounts of probability, in the world there are not
probabilities54 simpliciter but probabilities for something to happen: setting
aside probabilities in classical physics, even in the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics the probabilities associated to the wave function
are probabilities of measurement outcomes to occur. So again, what is the
meaning of the wave function in Barbour’s timeless picture? For sure, it is
not the probability of a given time-capsule to be actualized, since all the
time capsules are equally real. Even if the time capsules bearing the highest
probability amplitudes would be more “special” in some respect to the others,
e.g. by containing both extremely fine structured record-like-configurations
54Or degrees of belief, in the Bayesian case.
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and also brain-experiencing-temporal-becoming-like configurations, still it is
totally unclear what the higher probability assigned to such complex nows
would amount to, given that there is nothing external to these configurations
against which we can evaluate their “likelihood”.
All the above problems of course vanish in RBM. First of all, the fact that the
theory allows for continuous histories in relational configuration space makes
it possible to dispense with the notion of time-capsules: the appearance of
records in a given configuration is physically linked to the structure of the
precedent one in a given history. Moreover, in this framework, the wave
function has a clear job, i.e. fixing a history. There are not even such things
like superpositions of histories since, once the initial conditions are fixed, a
single history is automatically selected. In short, RBM gives a more nice and
well-behaved account of the wave function, and provides a quite intuitive
mechanism for the appearance of temporal becoming from the underlying
quantum regime. Still one may claim that Barbour’s picture is more faithful
to the minimalist requirement, since it totally eschews whatever temporal
structure from the ontological picture. This is fair enough, but it seems to us
that a metaphysics that renounces time completely would never reach the ex-
planatory power of one that acknowledges the fundamental existence of some
time-like ordering, as weak as this might be. Of course, we are are ready to
withdraw this claim if confronted with a convincing counter-example.
We now turn to a second proposal, due to Gryb and Thébault (2012), for
recovering time in a quantum relational context. Roughly, the authors ar-
gue that quantizing classical relational systems using Dirac quantization and
other derivative approaches is misleading and leads to theories that are not
genuine quantizations of the starting ones. In the standard treatment of
Hamiltonian gauge systems, in fact, the Hamiltonian constraints are seen as
generating merely gauge transformations; once such a framework is quan-
tized, it leads to a dynamics dictated by a Wheeler-DeWitt-like equation,
which in turn leads to all the well-known conceptual problems related to
the timelessness of such an equation. More precisely, what is lost in the
quantization procedure is the possibility to fix a particular parameter in the
equations of motion such that a universal time can be shown to emerge. The
starting point of the authors is the result due to Barbour and Foster (2008)
that, for systems whose dynamics is described by a Jacobi-like principle, the
Hamiltonian constraints generate a dynamics that is not just gauge.55 The
authors exploit this fact in the context of a path integral approach to the
55See also Pitts (2014) for a more general discussion of the problem.
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quantization of classical systems56 to show that the global Hamiltonian can be
decomposed in a way that gives rise to a universal Schrödinger-like evolution
for the quantized theory in terms of a privileged parameter that plays the role
of an absolute time. At the root of this framework lies an alternative scheme
for classifying symmetries, which qualifies classical reparametrization invari-
ance as a kind of symmetry quite distinct from mere gauge.57 This means
that the temporal degree of freedom is not an “otiose” variable that should
be eliminated in the quantization procedure by imposing that the proper
operator (the Hamiltonian) annihilates the physical states, but represents
an underlying ordering of states that should be preserved in the quantized
theory.
This second proposal for recovering a notion of time from the relational quan-
tum formalism seems more satisfactory than Barbour’s one, since it dispenses
with the problematic notion of time capsules. The physical picture provided
by Gryb and Thébault is akin to the one presented in this paper because
the idea of constructing a universal clock for the subsystems of the universe
derives entirely from the fact that the global dynamics unfolds according to
an arbitrary monotonically increasing parameter that labels states: hence we
have also here an ordering that resembles a B-series of time. However, such an
approach reintroduces a universal Schrödinger-like dynamics which, from a
Bohmian perspective, is less desirable than aWheeler-DeWitt-like one featur-
ing a static wave function. Moreover, Gryb and Thébault’s framework retains
a purely quantum spirit in that it just deals with quantum states that are in
general superposed, and that are subjected to collapse upon “extra-universe
observation” (whatever this might mean). In short, this approach exhibits
all the conceptual drawbacks of standard quantum theory - starting from a
“cosmological” measurement problem -, even if it dispenses with the concep-
tual pain of having a universal dynamics dictated by a Wheeler-DeWitt-like
equation alone. In the RBM program, by contrast, there are no troubles
related to superpositions and collapses. RBM, in fact, deals with concrete
structures, namely, universal configurations of particles, whose dynamics is
fixed once and for all when the initial conditions are given. Moreover, RBM is
able to recover time from the underlying quantum regime without modifying
the assumptions behind the appearance of a Wheeler-DeWitt-like dynamics.
56But see Gryb and Thébault (2015a) for a new implementation of this framework in
terms of a generalized Hamilton-Jacobi formalism.
57This alternative taxonomy is presented and explained in a philosophical fashion in
Gryb and Thébault (2015b, section 2).
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4.3 Relational Bohmian Mechanics and Local Beables
Let us finally focus on another delicate aspect of the RBM program, that
is, its closeness to the aims of primitive ontology approaches to quantum
physics. As we have already pointed out, RBM dispenses with the notion
of entities localized in a background spacetime as fundamental. The threat
behind such a remark is evident: it seems that RBM betrays the very spirit of
primitive ontology approaches to quantum theories discussed in the first sec-
tion. In fact, postulating material stuff decorating spacetime is the key move
in restoring a robust link between quantum phenomena and experiments by
unifying the ontological picture: all there is, at whatever scale, is just stuff
in spacetime and so things like pointers or spots on a photographic plate
are nothing but conglomerates of primitive stuff. Hence, the worry that, by
removing space and time from such a picture, we undermine the robustness
of this link, becomes all the more justified.
First of all, we notice how the derivation of macroscopic objects from spa-
tiotemporally localized primitive stuff - or local beables - is physically salient
in the sense introduced by Maudlin (2007, p. 3161, last paragraph). Put it
simply, the reconstruction of, say, pointer positions from particles dynamics
is not only mathematically well-established but also conservative as much
as physics is concerned: at both levels we have stuff in spacetime; what we
are doing is just a coarse-graining of the description. Hence, if we take mea-
surements as physically salient, then there is no problem in arguing that the
underlying structure posited by the theory is physically salient as well, and
viceversa. But what can we say of a well-defined mathematical procedure to
derive stuff in spacetime from fundamental entities that, by themselves, are
not in space and time? To shoot it straight on target: even if best-matching
lets us derive the empirical predictions of BM from RBM, what is the phys-
ical meaning we should attach to this story, provided there is any?
The above question is taken up by Huggett and Wüthrich (2013, see espe-
cially the discussion in section 3),58 who point out the two “directions” from
which Maudlin’s worry about physical salience can be considered, namely,
“from below” (take for granted the physical salience of our physical theory
and ask what formal reconstruction of macroscopic objects preserve such
trait), and “from above” (take for granted that the empirical realm is physi-
cally salient and ask how such salience is inherited by our physical theory).
Let us assume that RBM has the physical salience we want and ask ourselves
how standard BM can inherit such a salience. The answer to this question
58These authors consider the issue in the context of quantum theories of gravity that do
not posit space and time as fundamental entities; however, their reasoning easily applies
to the program considered here.
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is indeed very simple: Agreed, RBM does not postulate a background space-
time, but still it postulates a weak spatial ordering for particles and a weak
temporal ordering for universal configurations. Moreover, the formal recon-
struction of BM from RBM just consists of adding further physical degrees
of freedom to such fundamental orderings. Metaphorically speaking, in pass-
ing from RBM to BM, we are not altering the structure of the picture: we
are just “embellishing” it. The same reasoning applies to the inverse prob-
lem: if BM is physically salient, then, since the spatial and temporal metrics
in BM are supervenient in a very strong sense on (indeed they are formally
reduced to) weak spatial and temporal orderings in RBM, also this latter the-
ory can count as physically salient. To sum up, there is no real ontological
discontinuity between RBM and BM in that (i) both theories rely on spatial
and temporal connotations in order to characterize particles’ dynamics and
(ii) the (neo-)Newtonian background of BM is reduced through a physically
justified procedure to the weak orderings of RBM. Moreover, in the case of
RBM, the two meanings of primitive ontology considered in the first section
simply overlap: all there is consists of particles arranged in configurations
through spatial relations and such configurations are exactly what is guided.
For this reason, RBM is not only loyal to the primitive ontology spirit but it
also offers a more parsimonious and compact account of primitive ontology
than BM.
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